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European Community Competition Law
and Member State Action
John Temple Lang *
Article 90 of the European Economic Community Treaty
("Treaty") prohibits member states from authorizing or ordering behav-
ior infringing upon European Economic Community ("Community") an-
titrust law, even in the case of state enterprises. Indeed, Community law
does not include a state action doctrine. However, it is not yet clear to
what degree this prohibition prevents member state measures having
competition-restricting effects. This article considers that question.
I. COMMUNITY CASE LAW ON STATE ACTION
Initially in the GB-Inno-BM1 case in 1977, and in a series of cases
recently, the European Court of Justice ("Court") has been faced with
the question whether Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, which prohibit
anticompetitive agreements and abuse of monopoly or dominant power
by enterprises, also prevent member states from encouraging or approv-
ing such behavior. While Articles 85 and 86 apply expressly only to en-
terprises, Article 5 requires member states to abstain from any activities
that could jeopardize the attainment of the Treaty's objectives.2 Article
90 provides that, even in the case of public enterprises, member states
must not enact or maintain in force measures that are contrary to any of
the rules of the Treaty, including Articles 85 and 86. Thus, as illustrated
by Article 90, Articles 85 and 86 do impact the measures taken by mem-
ber states.
* Director, Directorate General Competition, Commission of the European Communities.
Opinions expressed are purely personal.
I GB-INNO-BM v. ATAB, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2115, 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 283 (1977).
See also Openbaar Ministerie v. Van Tiggele, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 25, 47-48.
2 Temple Lang, Article 5 of the EEC Treaty: the Emergence of Constitutional Principles in the
Case Law of the Court of Justice, 10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 503 (1987).
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In GB-Inno-BM v. A TAB, the Court made a number of statements it
has confirmed over the last twelve years. First, the Court stated that
Article 5 prohibits member states from adopting measures depriving Ar-
ticle 85 of its effectiveness, or enabling enterprises to escape from the
constraints imposed by Articles 85 through 94. Article 90 is an example
of the principle stated in Article 5. The Court also stated that legislation
facilitating an abuse of a dominant position generally would be inconsis-
tent with other articles of the Treaty, and that an abuse was unlawful
even if encouraged by national legislation.
In Cullet v. Centre Leclerc Toulouse,3 the Court reasserted that
although Articles 85 and 86 are concerned with the behavior of enter-
prises, Article 5 obliges member states not to maintain in force any meas-
ures that may render ineffective the competition rules applicable to
enterprises. However, the measures before the Court in Cullet did not
compel firms to enter into restrictive agreements, but instead gave re-
sponsibility for price fixing to the public authorities. According to the
Court, the mere fact that the price fixed by a supplier is one of the factors
taken into account by the authorities in fixing the retail price does not
prevent the measures from being state measures, and such action by the
member state "is not capable of depriving the rules on competition of
their effectiveness." The Court held that Article 5 does not prohibit
member states from enacting legislation of the kind in question in Cullet,
and also concluded more broadly that Article 5 does not prohibit na-
tional authorities from providing national rules fixing a minimum price
for retail fuel sales. The legislation at issue in Cullet was inconsistent,
however, with Article 30. This perhaps explains the brevity of the
Court's judgment on the competition issue. The judgment does not ex-
plain its reasoning in comparison with the reasoning in Leclerc v. Au Ble
Vert,4 which was decided a few weeks earlier.
Clarification of the law depends heavily on the correct interpretation
of the Leclerc case, which concerned a French law obliging book retailers
to substantially charge the price fixed by the publisher or importer. The
national court asked whether Articles 3(f) and 5 prohibited such legisla-
tion. The Court began its opinion by reasserting that member states may
not detract from the uniform application of Community law or from the
effectiveness of Articles 85 and 86 or measures implementing them. The
legislation in question did not impose an obligation to enter into restric-
3 Cullet v. Centre Leclerc Toulouse, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 305. The Court simply re-
ferred to this judgment in a series of cases later in 1985.
4 Leclerc v. Au Ble Vert, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1. See also Syndicat Des Libraires De
Normandie v. Societe L'Aigle Distribution, Case 254/87 (July 14, 1988).
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tive agreements, but made them unnecessary by placing responsibility for
freely fixing binding retail prices on publishers and importers. The Court
said that since purely national price-fixing systems in the book trade had
not yet been made subject to a Community competition policy with
which member states would be obliged to comply, member states' obliga-
tions under Article 5 were not specific enough to prevent them from en-
acting legislation of the kind in question, provided that the legislation
was consistent with other Treaty rules.
This implies that if a clear Community competition policy on the
controversial question of book price-fixing agreements were adopted by
the Community institutions, member states would not be free to enact
legislation obliging retailers to follow prices fixed by publishers and im-
porters. Member states cannot be obliged to comply with obligations
under Article 5 unless it is clear what those obligations are in the particu-
lar context of the industry in question. As soon as those obligations are
clear enough, though, they prohibit not only encouragement and confir-
mation of restrictive agreements, but also legislation with effects so simi-
lar as to make the restrictive agreements unnecessary.
If this were not the correct interpretation of Leclerc, and if the prin-
ciple really intended by the Court prohibited official measures encourag-
ing or confirming restrictive agreements and permitted official measures
directly causing identical economic effects, the key section of the decision
in which the Court outlines the absence of any clear policy or price fixing
for books would be unnecessary, irrelevant and misleading. The Court
concluded that member states' obligations are not specific enough, be-
cause purely national book trade practices have "not yet" been made
subject to a Community competition policy. The clear implication from
this language is that states' obligations would be clear and more stringent
if a competition policy for books were adopted. Although this interpre-
tation of the Leclerc opinion seems clear, the Court did not find it neces-
sary to pursue the same logic in Cullet, deciding the case instead under
Article 30 only.
In the second Bureau National du Cognac case,5 a governmental
measure had extended the effect of an agreement contrary to Article 85
to all the members of an officially established trade association. The
Court ruled in a brief opinion that to reinforce an agreement by ex-
tending its effects was not permissible. In Ministere Public v. Asjes,6 a
compulsory official approval procedure for airline fares with penalties for
5 Bureau National Interprofessionnel de Cognac v. Aubert, Comm. Mkt. L.R. Antitrust Supp.
(Oct., 1988), at 331.
6 Ministere Public v. Asjes, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1425.
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non-compliance was in effect, although the fares were fixed by agree-
ments between competitors contrary to Article 85. The Court stated that
Articles 85 and 86 would be deprived of their effectiveness by measures
approving unlawful agreements or reinforcing their effects.
In Vlaamse Reisbureaus v. VZWSociale Dienst van de Plaatsekike,7
national legislation obliged travel agencies to charge the prices fixed by
an agreement between certain tour operators, which prohibited them
from sharing commissions with or granting rebates to their clients. The
agreement clearly infringed Article 85. The legislation effectively made it
impossible for the parties to bring the agreement and its effects to an end,
imposed obligations on companies which were not parties to the agree-
ments, and created an effective sanction for breach of the agreement by
providing for withdrawal of the license of a travel agency infringing the
rules. The Court repeated the relevant rules, and not suprisingly, de-
cided that it was contrary to Articles 3(f), 5 and 85 for a member state to
reinforce the effects of an agreement which violated Article 85 in this
manner.
In CBEM-Telemarketing v. CLT & IBP,8 the court confirmed that
Article 86 applies to the behavior of an enterprise in a dominant position,
even when its position is due to legislation creating a situation in which
there is little or no competition. The Court did not need to consider
whether the legislation itself was inconsistent with the duties of the mem-
ber state under Community law since it did not order the commission of
the abuse.
A more far-reaching question arose in Van Eycke v. ASPA,9 a 1988
case involving a Belgian tax exemption for interest on deposits. In Van
Eycke, the legislation in question gave an income tax exemption only for
deposits carrying less than a specified maximum interest rate and less
than certain maximum premiums for long duration deposits. The plain-
tiff argued that this legislation discouraged competition between the de-
posit-taking institutions. The Court summarized its previous decisions,
saying that although Articles 85 and 86 concern only the behavior of
enterprises, member states are obliged by Article 5 not to maintain in
force legislation that is likely to eliminate the useful effects of those Arti-
cles. Accordingly, a member state may not order or approve the making
of restrictive agreements or reinforce the effects of such agreements. In
7 Vlaamse Reisbureaus v. VZW Sociale Dienst van de Plaatselijke, Case 311/85 (Oct. 1, 1987).
8 CBEM-Telemarketing v. CLT & IBP, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3261.
9 Van Eycke v. ASPA, Case 267/86 (Sept. 21, 1988). See also Bodson v. Pompes Funebres,
Case 30/87 (May 4, 1988).
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addition, a state may not delegate to companies its powers to take eco-
nomic measures.
There was no evidence in Van Eycke, however, to show that the
legislation in question did any of these things since it did not take over
the essence of a pre-existing agreement or oblige or encourage companies
to comply with it. Moreover, the legislation did not ratify or confirm the
method of limiting the interest rates paid or the interest rates adopted by
previous agreements. It was the legislation, not the financial institutions,
which fixed the interest rates which were eligible for the tax exemption.
The fact that the authorities had discussed these rates with the financial
institutions did not make the legislation contrary to Community law.
II. ARTICLE 86
The Court has not yet had an opportunity to clarify the implications
of the caselaw for Article 86, or to explore fully the implications of the
principle that a member state cannot confer on enterprises its powers to
regulate economic activity. One would expect the rules applicable to Ar-
ticle 86 to be the same, mutatis mutandis, as those applicable to Article
85. Abuses are more varied in nature than restrictive agreements and
practices, and they are objectionable for a wider variety of reasons.
Therefore, the law under Article 86 is not as clear or as well-developed as
under Article 85.
Member states are not free to enact or maintain in force measures
that are likely to frustrate the purposes of Article 86, either by requiring
or approving behavior which constitutes an abuse, or by confirming or
reinforcing the effects of an abuse that has already been committed. Sim-
ilarly, member states may not encourage or assist the commission of an
abuse by any enterprise in a dominant position. However, Article 86 is
normally concerned with the behavior itself, and not with the process by
which the behavior is decided. To the contrary, Article 85 is concerned
with the existence of an agreement, decision, or concerted practice. It
follows that a member state might infringe its obligations in relation to
Article 85 by encouraging companies to agree on restrictions of competi-
tion, irrespective of the precise restraint resulting. With Article 86, the
only questions to be looked at would be whether the behavior was an
abuse and whether the state action had required, encouraged, approved,
or reinforced it. Further, in relation to Article 86, it is hard to imagine
circumstances in which a regime arranged in violation of the Article
would be extended by state action to companies not previously affected
by it.
It is true that if an enterprise in a dominant position commits an
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abuse, action can be taken against it, whether or not it is acting on the
state's instructions. In practice, however, an enterprise in this situation
would simply refer to the instructions or encouragement it had received
from the state and would certainly argue that it should not be fined. If
the member state is primarily responsible for the nature of the behavior
in question, the primary defendant could be the state and not the enter-
prise. If one or more enterprises were found to have infringed Articles 85
and 86, and the state measure was unchallenged by the Commission, the
enterprises would be in an unsatisfactory position, especially if the mea-
sure purported to be legally binding. Since Articles 85, 86 and 90 are
directly applicable, it may well be that a plaintiff injured by behavior
contrary to those Articles could recover damages from the state, as well
as from the dominant enterprise, if the state were primarily responsible
for the behavior in question.
The Court's statement in Van Eycke, that member states are not free
to delegate to enterprises the state's power to take economic measures,
primarily concerned cases arising under Article 85. The issue before the
Court was whether a state, wishing to see the price of a given product or
service stabilized, could invite the suppliers to agree on prices rather than
fixing the price itself. That is clearly a violation of Community law by
the state, as well as by the companies, because the process by which the
prices would be fixed is contrary to Article 85.
The situation is rather different when the possible abuse is commit-
ted by a dominant enterprise acting alone. A dominant firm must fix the
price of the products or services it provides and the terms on which it
provides them. As long as there is no state measure or consultation with
competitors, the process by which the firm arrives at that result is not a
regulatory or a governmental process and does not infringe competition
law. If the member state orders a dominant enterprise to charge a price
which is so high as to be "unfair" or so low as to be "predatory," or
directs an enterprise to impose terms that are onerous or otherwise un-
lawful, it is clear that the state, as well as the enterprise, is acting ille-
gally. In this situation, the state has not delegated any power to take
regulatory economic measures or altered the nature of the measures it
has taken. However, member states do sometimes give regulatory pow-
ers to state bodies of various kinds, thereby enabling them to combine
entrepreneurial and regulatory activities. The words of the Court, "oper-
ateurs priv6s," do not apply to state enterprises and thus do not entirely
prevent member states from doing this. However, these words do not
fully clarify the legal position which will arise when this is done.
At first sight, Community law does not prevent member states from
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delegating governmental powers even to private bodies, provided that
they do not do so for the purpose of avoiding their own obligations under
Community law, or do so in such a way so as to invite or enable private
firms to infringe rules applying to them. On the other hand, Article 85
prohibits private firms from agreeing on prices in their own interests. In
addition, agreements between private firms, if permitted, are not known
to the public and are not subject to either democratic control or judicial
review. Therefore, there are arguments for saying that member states, by
analogy, should not give regulatory powers to dominant enterprises when
those enterprises would be likely to exercise them in their own interests
rather than objectively in the interests of the public. It is not yet clear
whether the Court would go so far as to say that member states are pro-
hibited from conferring regulatory powers on a state body merely be-
cause the body in question also has profit-making functions, even when it
has a dominant position."t If the Court in due course does not go as far
as this, a more complex rule will have to be devised. The question may
be decided by the Court in the pending French Telecommunications
case. I I
It is clear that a member state cannot, by delegating regulatory or
other governmental powers, enable a state body to adopt measures which
it normally would be prohibited from adopting by Article 90 or other-
wise. Therefore, insofar as a state enterprise, or even an enterprise with
exclusive or special rights, may be given governmental or regulatory
powers lawfully, that enterprise is bound by Article 90. This is true even
in instances where a state enterprise regulates its own behavior, as dis-
tinct from merely deciding what it should do for commercial purposes.
In practice, such regulatory measures would violate Article 90 if they
applied to other enterprises, and if the state enterprise were the only en-
terprise in its industry, its behavior would be governed by Article 86.
Certainly it would be preferable if regulatory and entrepreneurial func-
tions were always separated. Conflicts of interest are unavoidable if these
functions overlap, as the Commission pointed out in its Directive on
Telecommunications Terminals.12
10 In Italy v. Commission, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 873, 886, the Court noted without objec-
tion the power of British Telecommunications to adopt "schemes" for users of equipment made
available by it. Article 86 applied because the schemes were "an integral part of BT's business
activity".
11 Commission v. France, Case 202/88 (not yet decided).
12 Directive on Competition in the Markets in Telecommunications Terminal Equipment, 31 0. J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 131) 73 (1988)[hereinafter Telecommunications Directive].
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The corresponding problems concerning joint dominant positions13
are less complex than one might suppose. A joint dominant position can
be abused by concerted action between the jointly dominant companies.
In such a situation, Article 85 is also infringed, and if this occurs as a
result of member state action, the caselaw of the Court provides the ap-
plicable principles. If member state action causes one or all of the jointly
dominant enterprises to abuse their position, it clearly infringes Article
90 or Article 5. If regulatory powers14 or powers controlling entry into
the market were given to the jointly dominant firms collectively, they
could be exercised only by action governed by Article 85.
III. OFFICIAL MEASURES RESTRICTING COMPETITION
Abuses of dominant positions, whether held jointly or singly, may
be either exploitative (e.g., charging monopoly prices) or anticompetitive
(e.g., restricting competition by acquiring a competitor).15 If it is con-
trary to Community law for a member state to order one or more domi-
nant enterprises to behave in such a way, the question arises whether it is
unlawful for a state to bring about the same economic result by legisla-
tion or other official measures. The answer to this question appears to be
yes based upon the GB-INNO-BM, Cullet, and Leclerc cases, although
the precise terms of the rule are not yet completely clear. At least as far
as it concerns anticompetitive behavior, this question is part of a larger
question, namely to what extent Community law limits the powers of
member states to take measures restricting competition and establishing
monopolies. The Court's probable response to this question is also al-
ready visible, although not yet certain.
Community law prohibits member states from restricting competi-
tion in a variety of protectionist ways. For example, Community law
prohibits protectionist taxes and measures with effects equivalent to
quantitative restrictions, including price control legislation if it has ef-
fects equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports. 16 In addition,
Community law prohibits all restrictions on the free movement of goods
13 Temple Lang, Trade Associations and Self-Regulation under EEC Antitrust Law, 1984 FORD-
HAM CORPORATE L. INsT. 605 (1985).
14 See Commission v. Italy, Case 118/85 (June 16, 1987) (regulatory powers given to a state
enterprise).
15 Temple Lang, Abuse of Dominant Positions in European Community Law, Present and Future:
Some Aspects, FIFTH FORDHAM CORPORATE L. INsT. 25, 41-47 (1979).
16 See, eg., Tasca, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 291, 308; Openbaar Ministerie v. Van Tiggele,
1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 25, 39; Commission v. Italy, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1955, 1969;
Roussel Laboratoria v. Netherlands, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3849; Nederlandse Bakkerij v. Edah
BV, Cases 80/85, 159/85, (Nov. 13, 1986).
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which are stricter than is essential to achieve legitimate aims. 7
These rules of Community law prohibit even general measures
adopted by member states in the public interest and the granting of some
specific rights. For example, the Court held in Pubblico Ministero v.
Manghera that no exclusive right to import goods from other member
states is permissible.' 8 Therefore, as the Commission stated in the
French Telecommunications case,' 9 it is incorrect to say that Article 90
presupposes the maintenance of all special or exclusive rights. The main
point of Article 90 is to insist that Treaty rules be obeyed even when
exclusive rights are given, and to provide an especially effective proce-
dure to deal with infringements. By implication, Community law also
limits the exclusive rights which can be given.
One exception to the general principle in Article 90 is that enter-
prises may be entrusted with the operation of services of general eco-
nomic interest or made into revenue-producing monopolies. Under
Article 90(2), such enterprises would still be subject to all Treaty rules,
including the rules on competition, "insofar as the application of such
rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particu-
lar tasks assigned to them." Therefore, although "special or exclusive
rights" may be given, all the rules of the Treaty apply, even when they
are given to enterprises specifically responsible for services of general
economic interest, except insofar as the rules obstruct the particular task
given. Only if the "particular task" inherently necessitates a monopoly,
as in the case of a central bank or an air traffic control authority, is there
a partial dispensation from the Treaty rules. At first sight, it is not easy
to reconcile the fact that Article 90 allows for exclusive rights to be
given, with the principle that the competition rules apply fully, because
such a wide variety of situations are covered by these two principles.
There are, broadly, two views as to the correct application of the
Treaty rules. The first view is that, subject to the rules already outlined,
member states are free to establish monopolies, either overtly or indi-
rectly by setting up licensing systems and granting licenses only to one
company, thereby enlarging or strengthening the licensee. According to
this narrow view, Articles 5 and 90 merely state that member states may
not associate themselves with infringements of competition law by com-
panies, but are free to achieve the same results by state measures if no
infringement has been committed by companies. This view, while not yet
17 See Commission v. Denmark, Case 302/86 (Sept. 20, 1988) (returnable bottles case); Com-
mission v. Greece, Case 124/85, para. 13 (Dec. 16, 1986).
18 Pubblico Ministero v. Manghera, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 91.
19 Commission v. France, MDSU/Case 202/88 (not yet decided).
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expressly rejected by the Court, is not reconcilable with the GB-INNO-
BM, Cullet and Leclerc cases.
The second view,2" essentially adopted by the Commission, states
that under Article 5, member states must abstain from jeopardizing the
objectives of the Treaty, and that undistorted competition is one of those
objectives under Articles 3(f), 101 and 102. A fortiori, member states
may not exclude competition by setting up monopolies,2 unless such
measures are actually and objectively necessary for a permissible purpose
under Community law. Under this view, the caselaw that addresses state
measures which encourage restrictive agreements by companies exempli-
fies the broader principle that limits the powers of member states to re-
strict competition and prevents them from limiting the effects of the
competition rules.
In accordance with this second view, member states are not free to
adopt measures that produce the same results as infringements of the
competition rules binding companies, either because such measures do
not have a permissible purpose or effect or because such measures are
contrary to a very precise rule of Community law. Moreover, member
states are not free to restrain or eliminate competition even for a permis-
sible purpose, unless the competition is no more restricted than is essen-
tial to achieve the purpose desired, and unless that purpose is important
enough to justify the interference with the competition in question. The
question remaining, therefore, is whether the Court will ultimately syn-
20 The Telecommunications Directive, supra note 12, at 75, para. 13, provides, "... such special
or exclusive rights in regard to the terminal equipment market give rise to a situation which is
contrary to the objective of Article 3(f) of the Treaty, which provides for the institution of a system
ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted, and requires afortiori that compe-
tition must not be eliminated. Member states have an obligation under Article 5 of the Treaty to
abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty,
including Article 3(f). The exclusive rights to import ald market terminal equipment must there-
fore be regarded as incompatible with Article 86 in conjunction with Article 3, and the grant or
maintenance of such rights by a member state is prohibited under Article 90(1)."
See two particularly important studies: Pescatore, Public and private aspects of Community
Competition Law, 1986 FORDHAM CORPORATE L. INsT. 381-430 (1987); Verstrynge, The Oligations
of Member States as Regards Competition in the EEC Treaty, 1988 FORDHAM CORPORATE L. INST.
(forthcoming). See also Verstrynge, Competition Policy in the Air Transport Sector, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT EUROPEEN (Saloniki,
1988) (forthcoming); Temple Lang, Community Antitrust Law and Government Measures Relating to
Public and Privileged Enterprises: Article 90 EEC Treaty, 1984 FORDHAM CORPORATE L. INST. 543,
565-573 (1985). The contrary view expressed by Marenco in Le traite CEE interdit-il aux Etats
Membres de restreindre le concurrence, 1986 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPEEN 285, was rejected by
Judge Joliet, National Anti-competitive Legislation and Community Law, 1988 FORDHAM CORPO-
RATE L. INST. (1989), and by Pescatore, European Community Competition Law - A Rejoinder by
Judge Pescatore, 10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 444-445 (1987).
21 Europemballage & Continental Can v. Commission, 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215, 12
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 199 (1979).
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thesize the undoubted restrictions on member states' freedom to restrict
competition into a single comprehensive principle or will treat the re-
strictions as a number of specific uncoordinated restraints on otherwise
unrestricted powers.
It should be pointed out that there is no provision in the Treaty
which guarantees member states any residual zone of unrestricted eco-
nomic sovereignty, and Community law contains no clauses listing or
defining federal or state powers.22 Thus, statements about state sover-
eignty have no express basis in the Treaty.
It would be odd, if not absurd, if member states were prohibited
from ordering or authorizing companies to bring about a particular re-
sult, but were entirely free to achieve the same result themselves directly.
Anomalies and irrational results certainly would occur if the above cited
case law were based only on the objections to delegating governmental
powers to enterprises. It would be uncharacteristic of Community law to
be concerned with the means rather than the result, the form rather than
the substance. Such an interpretation would be an invitation to lobby
member states, since firms could bring about by national legislation that
which they could not achieve by agreement or behavior. It would also be
odd to have a stricter rule for companies than for member states, when
member states have greater opportunities to interfere with the operation
of the Community.
The Court has interpreted Article 5 as creating a wide variety of far-
reaching obligations on member states.23 It would be consistent with the
manner in which Article 5 has been interpreted to state that Article 5
limits member states' freedom to restrict competition by any means, and
not merely by encouraging or reinforcing private restrictions on competi-
tion. The Court stated in GB-INNO-BM v. A TAB that Article 90 is only
a particular example of a general principle derived from Article 5. It
follows that Article 90 may be used to clarify the concrete application of
the more general article. If, as the second view holds, there is a general
obligation not to interfere unjustifiably with competition, and a series of
stricter obligations exist when Community rules are more precisely de-
fined in specific areas, it is entirely reasonable to use the Court's rulings
in specific situations to clarify the general principle. The Court's practice
is to state very broad principles of law and to try to unify the whole of
Community law, when it sees a way to do so clearly.
The view that the Treaty rules should be interpreted as broadly lim-
22 Temple Lang, European Community Constitutional Law: the Division of Powers between the
Community and Member States, 39 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 209 (1988).
23 Temple Lang, supra note 15.
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iting the powers of member states to restrict or eliminate competition, if
valid, is a comprehensive, across-the-board, and far-reaching principle.
It therefore needs to be argued on the basis of similarly comprehensive
and far-reaching arguments, even if the cases already decided by the
Court deal with narrower questions, and the broad principle needs to be
induced from them. There are three relevant principles of Community
law which constitute arguments supporting this view. The first argument
is based on Article 5 and has already been outlined. The second argu-
ment is based on the principle of proportionality, and the third is based
on the principle of non-interference.
When the Treaty permits member states to create exceptions to gen-
eral principles of Community law, notably as it does under Article 36,
member states are obliged to go no further than is necessary to achieve
the objectives permitted.24 This is a specific application of the principle
of proportionality, which states that no measure may be adopted either
by Community or national authorities in the sphere of Community law
which imposes costs, restrictions, or inconveniences that are unnecessary
or out of proportion to the aims to be achieved, even when those aims are
lawful. This is such a fundamental general principle of Community law
that one would expect it to limit the powers of member states to restrict
or eliminate competition, even for legitimate general economic purposes.
If it does apply, as has been suggested by several authors,25 the effect
would be that member states adopting measures restricting or eliminat-
ing competition would have to show that there was no other less restric-
tive way of achieving the legitimate aim sought, even if the measures
could not be regarded as primarily benefiting existing companies. The
member states -could not say that Community law imposed no restric-
tions on their powers of establishing monopolies or restricting competi-
tors other than those expressly imposed by the Treaty.
The principle of proportionality would have to be applied on the
basis of the circumstances of the industry or sector concerned, and upon
any relevant provisions of Community law. Where, as in air transport,
there is a clear Community policy in favor of progressively increasing
competition, national measures creating or maintaining a monopoly
would be correspondingly harder to justify. The Leclerc judgment illus-
trates this principle. In fact, it is only in a few areas, such as a central
bank or an air traffic control authority, that a monopoly is inherently
24 See supra note 17.
25 The principle of proportionality as a limit on the power of member states to restrict competi-
tion by even general legislative measures is mentioned by several of the authors cited at supra note
20. See also Casati, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2595, paras. 27-28.
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necessary for effectiveness, as distinct from being merely desirable to
achieve economies of scale or to avoid duplication of costs of
infrastructure.
It will be seen that the proportionality principle is both an argument
for limiting the powers of member states to restrict competition and to
establish monopolies, and also a moderating influence on that principle.
The principle does not prohibit member states from restricting or elimi-
nating competition, but merely states that they must go no further than is
necessary to achieve an otherwise legitimate aim in the public interest.
The greater the restriction on competition, the harder it is to justify.
The Court has already held in a number of cases2 6 that the principle
of proportionality applies to member states' measures in certain areas of
Community law. The argument suggested here is that those areas must
also include the general objectives of the Treaty and specific objectives
adopted in relation to specific sectors. Seen in this way, there is nothing
very remarkable about the conclusion that the principle of proportional-
ity limits the powers of member states to restrict competition and estab-
lish monopolies. Indeed, since the principle applies in relatively
unimportant issues such as the maximum penalties appropriate to spe-
cific breaches of Community rules, afortiori, one would expect it to apply
to major national measures.
The proportionality principle is primarily a rule limiting govern-
mental intervention in economic activity. However, this principle or an-
other similar principle also governs situations in which conflicting
legitimate objectives must be reconciled. The Court has applied this
principle in Community measures cases.2 7 Therefore, it is suitable for
reconciling national measures taken to promote one legitimate objective
with Community measures, including Treaty provisions, which pursue
another objective.
26 See, e.g., Rewe-Zentrale v. Bundesmonopol verwaltung fur Brantwein, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 649 (Cassis de Dijon case); Commission v. Greece, Case 176/84 (Mar. 12, 1987); Brugnoni &
Ruffinengo, Case 157/85 (June 24, 1986) (member states may require deposit of securities with an
approved bank only if it is indispensable to monitor compliance with national legislation compatible
with Community directives on capital movements); Adverteerders, Case 352/85, para. 36 (April 26,
1988). See also Weiler, The European Court at the Crossroads: Community Human Rights and Mem-
ber State Action, Liber Amicorum Pierre Pescatore; Temple Lang, The Duties of National Courts
under the Constitutional Law of the Community, 1987 Dominik Lasok Lecture (Exeter, 1987).
27 Beus v. Hauptzollamt Munchen, 1968 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 83, 98 (the Court speaks of
"balancing" interests which cannot be simultaneously and fully attained); International Fruit Co. v.
Commission, 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 411, para. 64; Balkan v. Hauptzollamt Berlin-Packhof,
1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1091, 1110-12; Roquette v. France, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1835,
1844; Ludwigshafener Walzmuhle v. France, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3211, 3252; Biovilac v.




The most important example of this use of the principle concerns
the national objectives recognized by Article 36 of the Treaty as legiti-
mate exceptions to the general Community principle of free movement of
goods.28 This is not merely an example of the rule that exceptions must
be interpreted narrowly. A fortiori, one would expect the principle to
limit the powers of member states to pursue objectives not Specifically
recognized by the Treaty as legitimate exceptions to Community rules.
The area of concurrent jurisdiction of Community and national authori-
ties is so great that it must be a fundamental principle of the Community
system that national and Community authorities should respect one an-
other's objectives and spheres of activity. In the Community, the rela-
tionship between Community and national authorities is one of
cooperation and symbiosis, not one based on more or less mutually ex-
clusive spheres of jurisdiction.29 This cooperation explains, and indeed
necessitates, the fact that many substantive rules of Community law ap-
ply equally to Community and national measures.30
The third supporting argument referred to above is based on the
long-established principle of non-interference, which states that member
states may not adopt measures that interfere with the operation of Com-
munity law,31 even if the national measures do not conflict directly or
28 Freedom of competition, free movement of goods, and freedom of trade as a fundamental
right are all general principles of Community law. See Procureur de la Republique v. Adbhu, 1985
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 538, paras. 9,13; Staatsanwalt Freiburg v. Franz Keller, Case 234/85 (Oct. 8,
1986); Pescatore, Les principes generaux du droit en tant que source du droit communautaire, RAP-
PORTS DU 12E CONGRES, FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DE DROiT EUROPEEN, 17, 23-25 (Paris,
1986).
29 Temple Lang, European Community Constitutional Law: the Division of Powers Between the
Community and Member States, 39 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 209 (1988).
30 See Klensch, Joined Cases 201-202/85 (November 25, 1986); Temple Lang, supra note 26, at
19-22; Hartley, Federalism, Courts and Legal Systems: The Emerging Constitution of the European
Community, 34 AM. J. CoMP. L. 229, 243 (1986).
31 The Court has used several phrases to embody the rule described in the text as "non-interfer-
ence." See, eg., Procureur du Roi v. Kefer & Delmelle, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 103, 113 and
cases cited therein; Grosoli, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2621, 2631-32, 2635, and conclusions of
Capotorti AG at 2640; Pigs and Bacon Commission v. McCarren, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2161,
2188; Commission v Council (ERTA), 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 263; Procureur du Roi v.
Dechman, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1573; Pigs Marketing Board v. Redmond, 1978 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 2347, 2371; Frans Nederlandse Maatschappij voor Biologische Produkten BV, 1981 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3277, para. 14; Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association v. Government of
Ireland and Doyle v. Taoiseach, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 735. In the international field, see
Commission v. Ireland, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 937, paras. 26, 28; Kramer, 1976 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 1279, paras. 44-45,49-51; Commission v. United Kingdom, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2403,
2468, 2478; Ruling pursuant to Article 103 of the EAEC Treaty on the Physical Protection of Nu-
clear Materials, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2151, paras. 12, 14, 18, 22-3; Groothandel Wulro v.
Disciplinary Board of the Foundation for the Control of Free-Range Eggs, Case 130/85 (June 25,
1986); Direction General des Impors v. Marie-Louise Forest, Case 148/85 (Nov. 25, 1986) (the
latter two cases use the formula that national measures may not "undermine or create exceptions to"
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 10:114(1989)
explicitly with a Community rule. This principle was developed primar-
ily in case law concerned with the Common Agricultural Policy, but it is
equally applicable to any other rule or policy of the Community that is
precise enough for interference with it to be clearly identifiable. This
principle is especially important in the case of Community rules or poli-
cies that are intended to operate without the constant involvement of
Community institutions. Competition is perhaps the best example of
this. It follows from this principle that member states must not interfere
at all with the operation of precisely defined rules of Community compe-
tition policy, and they must not interfere with less precisely defined rules
to an extent great enough to defeat their purposes. It may well be that
this argument is essentially the same as that based on Article 5, but as the
principle of non-interference has developed in the caselaw without ex-
press reference to Article 5, it seems preferable to discuss it separately.
In any event, the caselaw discussing the principle of non-interference
clearly confirms and reinforces the argument based on Article 5 outlined
above.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE Two VIEWS
In order to discuss the implications of the two differing views as to
the correct interpretation of the Treaty rules, and the arguments support-
ing them, it is necessary to review particular cases and specific issues.
The Court confirmed in the Telemarketing case in 1985, that "it is not
incompatible with Article 86 for an undertaking to which a member state
has granted exclusive rights within the meaning of Article 90 of the
Treaty to enjoy a monopoly." However, the Court went on to rule that a
dominant enterprise infringes Article 86 if, without any objective neces-
sity, it reserves to itself an ancillary activity in a neighboring but separate
market, with the possibility of eliminating all competition from that mar-
ket. It follows from this and from other case law that a member state
could not encourage or ratify such behavior by a dominant enterprise if it
thereby eliminates competition, that is, if it establishes a monopoly. The
issue is whether the member state itself could adopt a measure having the
same result, "without any objective necessity."
'32
Whatever the exact implications of Leclerc may be, it is clear that
member states are not free to adopt measures having the principal pur-
Community rules); Commission v. Italy, Case 48/85 (Sept. 18, 1986); UNILEC, Case 212/87, (Sept.
22, 1988). See generally, Waelbroeck, The Emerging Doctrine of Community Pre-emption - consent
and redelegation, COURTS AND FREE MARKETS 548 (Sandalow and Stein eds. 1982).
32 A member state could do this if it had a valid reason. Sacchi, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 409,
430. See also Italy v. Commission, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 873, 886.
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pose or effect of limiting competition for the benefit of existing competi-
tors. Nor are they free to adopt measures that bring about a situation
which would be unlawful under Article 86 if it resulted from the action
of a dominant position.33 In other words, states may not take measures
that are substitutes for behavior by enterprises which would infringe
those Articles. This is the minimum conclusion that can be drawn from
Article 90 and from the case law. To reject even this conclusion would
be to deprive the Court's repeated statements of all meaning. For the
purposes of applying this rule, the principal effect of the national measure
must be assessed objectively. Statements by national authorities that a
measure was intended to benefit only the public interest would not be
conclusive. The rule is a rule of Community law and must be uniformly
applied throughout the Community.
If this were a complete statement of the law, it would necessitate
distinguishing between general measures benefiting primarily the public
interest and specific measures benefiting primarily a limited number of
identifiable enterprises. Since the Treaty clearly makes free competition
an important element in Community policy, there would be a strong pre-
sumption that any measure that restricted competition and substantially
benefited a limited number of enterprises would not be objectively in the
public interest. The Court has already pointed out that legislation facili-
tating a breach of a dominant position is generally inconsistent with
other Treaty rules. Therefore, there is not as much difference as might at
first appear between the minimum practical conclusion to be drawn from
the case law and the broader view of the Treaty rules discussed above.
The same comment solves the issue of "exploitative" abuses pro-
moted by state measures, as distinct from "anticompetitive" abuses. In
practice, a state measure having effects equivalent to an exploitative
abuse necessarily would be primarily for the benefit of an identifiable cat-
egory of companies. If a measure imposed very high minimum prices for
a given product or imposed very onerous conditions on those who bought
the product, it would not necessarily be an abuse if the dominant compa-
nies imposed them. It is perhaps not easy to imagine a convincing exam-
ple. However, a state might impose an extremely high minimum price to
discourage unnecessary use of a strategically important material or im-
pose onerous conditions on buyers of a highly toxic or dangerous pollu-
tant. Such prices or conditions, if imposed for the same reasons by a
dominant enterprise, also would not be unlawful. However, a sharp dis-
33 In GB-INNO-BM, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2167, Advocate General Reischl stated,
"Member States are obliged... not to create by State measures positions which undertakings are
prohibited from creating under Article 86."
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tinction between measures in the public interest and measures primarily
benefiting specific companies does not need to be drawn if the view favor-
ing the interpretation of the Treaty rules as broadly limiting the powers
of member states to take measures restricting competition is correct.
V. CONCLUSION
The following should be borne in mind. The principle of propor-
tionality is not an invention of Community law which is alien to national
legal systems. It is derived from member state national laws. Article
90(2) reasonably can be regarded as a special rule applying the principle
of proportionality. In fact, it makes much more sense viewed in this way
than as an apparent exception to all the other rules of the Treaty. This
suggests that even in this respect, Article 90 is a specific instance of a
more general principle based on Article 5, as the Court stated in GB-
INNO-BM.
The Court, which likes to visualize Community law as a single con-
sistent whole, seems likely to be attracted to this argument. A national
monopoly, especially if state-owned, automatically excludes non-citizens
from access to the industry in question. Although not in itself contrary
to Community law, such a de facto exclusion needs a significant justifica-
tion. The aim of the Community is an open market. Further, free com-
petition in the Community is not merely an antitrust law objective, but
"the best way of uniting Europe."3 4 National monopolies hinder eco-
nomic integration, the overriding aim of the entire Community. It is
hardly conceivable that Community law, having so thoroughly, strictly,
and comprehensively restricted national powers in other respects, would
place no comprehensive limits on national powers with the potential for
frustrating so important and fundamental a purpose and method of the
Community.
The Leclerc case confirms the interpretation of the Treaty rules as
broadly limiting the power of member states to restrict competition in
another way, by showing that member states have more extensive and
stricter obligations where the Community law is specific than where it is
general. This is wholly consistent with the view that there is a broad
general obligation not to interfere with competition without adequate
reason, and specific obligations not to interfere with competition at all
where the Community law is sufficiently specific. There are degrees of
specificity. For example, Articles 85 and 86 are more specific than Arti-




cle 3(f), and a Community policy on retail price maintenance for books,
or a Commission decision in a particular case, would be more specific
and would imply stricter obligations than the Articles.
In the Sacchi case,3" which concerns an Italian television monopoly,
the Court stated that "measures governing the marketing of products
where the restrictive effect exceeds the effects intrinsic to trade rules are
capable of constituting measures having an effect equivalent to quantita-
tive restrictions. Such is the case, in particular, where the restrictive ef-
fects are out of proportion to their purpose, in the present case the
organisation, according to the law of a member state, of television as a
service in the public interest." This is a clear statement of the principle
of proportionality. In Sacchi, the Advocate General rejected the argu-
ment that television was a natural monopoly, implying that if it had been,
member states might have been free to take measures that they would not
have been free to adopt otherwise. This argument is entirely consistent
with the proportionality principle.
Article 37 of the Treaty deals with state monopolies of a commercial
character. The scope of Article 37 is extremely wide, requiring the end-
ing of all discrimination against imported products by all bodies
"through which a member state, in law or in fact, either directly or indi-
rectly supervises, determines or appreciably influences imports or exports
between member states. These provisions shall likewise apply to monop-
olies delegated by the state to others." Article 37 prohibits exclusive
rights to import from other member states.36 Article 37 does not apply
to services,37 but it is so wide and far-reaching in its effects that it would
be irrational if other monopolies could be established without any limita-
tion. In Italy v. Commission,38 the Court rejected as unsupported by evi-
dence the argument that restrictions by British Telecommunications on
the use of its equipment by private message forwarding agencies were
justified by "abuses" committed by the agencies. The implication that
genuinely undesirable behavior might justify a restriction on competition
is the result one would expect if the principle of proportionality applied.
It can be seen that the distinction between measures in the general
interest and measures primarily benefiting particular companies is still
relevant under the principle of proportionality, but as a spectrum rather
than as a clear dichotomy. The less the public benefit and the greater the
35 Sacchi, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 409.
36 Pubblico Ministero v. Manghera, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 91. See also Bodson v. Pompes
Funebres, Case 30/87 (May 4, 1988).
37 Amelioration de l'Elevage v. Mialocq, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. 1. Rep. 2057.
38 Italy v. Commission, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. Rep. 873, 887, 890.
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benefit to the companies, the more difficult it is to justify the measure.
The reasons for drawing the distinction are valid, but to regard it as a
spectrum rather than a clear distinction to be drawn at an identifiable
point corresponds much more closely to the realities of economic life.
In conclusion, member states' powers to take measures restricting
competition are limited across the board by Article 5 and by the principle
of proportionality. If that view is ultimately adopted explicitly by the
Court, the implications are of the greatest importance, both in the eco-
nomic law and the constitutional law of the Community. It is perhaps a
recognition of the importance of the basic question discussed in this arti-
cle that the Court has so far adopted a series of cautious and relatively
narrow judgments rather than stating the question in the broad terms in
which it is discussed here. One should not assume that the Court will
not accept the broad principle merely because it has chosen so far to
avoid unnecessary controversy and to make statements which are no
wider than has been necessary in particular cases. No case has yet been
argued before the Court on the broad lines stated here, and the Court
could hardly be expected to decide an issue of such importance without
hearing a very full argument. Nevertheless, there is now enough case law
to show the direction in which the Court is heading.
If the conclusion that the Treaty and the principle of proportionality
severely limit the powers of member states to restrict competition is cor-
rect, it has several important practical results. First, member states'
measures to establish monopolies, de jure and de facto, will need to be
justified by some clear purpose and will not be permissible if the same
objective could be achieved by less restrictive means. Second, the conclu-
sion confirms and creates a broader intellectual basis for the existing case
law which says that governmental measures protecting state enterprises
and other privileged companies from competition, and governmental
measures requiring actions companies themselves would not be free to
undertake, are not permitted. In theory, the conclusion implies that all
measures restricting competition would require justification, but it seems
likely that, in practice, general measures not resulting in monopolies and
not protecting individual companies from competition will always be jus-
tified by their objectives.
